I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Business and Management Science at NHH Norwegian School of Economics, and a member of the Centre for Shipping and Logistics. I received my PhD degree from NHH Norwegian School of Economics in 2020.
My research interests revolve around mathematical modeling in operations research and, in particular, modeling of collaborative transportation and logistics, from coalition formation through realization of the cooperation to distribution of associated costs or profits.
Osicka, O., Guajardo, M., van Oost, T. (2020). Cooperative game-theoretic features of cost sharing in location-routing. International Transactions in Operational Research, 27(4), 2157-2183.
While the interest in both collaborative logistics and location‐routing has grown considerably, horizontal cooperation in location‐routing problems remains fairly unattended. This article studies several variants of the location‐routing problem using a cooperative game‐theoretic framework. The authors derive characteristics in terms of subadditivity, convexity, and non‐emptiness of the core. Moreover, for some of the game variants, it is shown that for facility opening costs substantially larger than the costs associated with routing, the core is always nonempty. The theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments aimed at illustrating the properties and deriving insights. Among others, it is observed that, while in general it is not possible to guarantee core allocations, in a huge majority of cases the core is nonempty.
Osicka, O., Guajardo, M., Jörnsten, K. (2020). Cooperation of customers in traveling salesman problems with profits. Optimization Letters, 14, 1219-1233.
In the profitable tour problem, the carrier decides whether to visit a particular customer with respect to the prize the customer offers for being visited and traveling cost associated with the visit, all in the context of other customers. Our focus is on the prizes customers need to offer to ensure being visited by the carrier. This can be formulated as a cooperative game where customers may form coalitions and make decisions on the prize values cooperatively. We define the profitable tour game describing this situation and analyze the cost associated with each coalition of customers and prizes that help to achieve it. We derive properties of the optimal prizes to be offered when the grand coalition is formed. These properties describe relationship between the prizes and the underlying traveling salesman game to provide connection with extensive literature on core allocations in traveling salesman games. The most important result states that the set of optimal prizes coincides with the core of the underlying traveling salesman game if this core is nonempty.
Osička, O., Hrdina, J., Šomplák, R., Popela, P., Pavlas, M. (2016). Shapley value approximation for games with distant players. Mendel, 2016, 103–108.
The Shapley value provides a method for the division of total profit in cooperative games. Motivated by the waste management application, an algorithm to approximate the Shapley value is developed. The method is significantly faster than the classical approach to the Shapley value determination and can be used for any game where the distance of players can be measured and a critical value of distance, beyond which the cooperation between any two players is worthless, can be determined.
Nevrlý, V., Šomplák, R., Popela, P., Pavlas, M., Osička, O., Kůdela, J. (2016). Heuristic challenges for spatially distributed waste production identification problems. Mendel, 2016, 109–116.
The aim of the paper is to present the advances in the development of optimization foundations of software tool Justine designed for the forecasting of spatially distributed waste production under incomplete, uncertain, and even contradictory information. Justine tool has been already successfully used for practical computations that serve for investment planning in the area of waste processing unit allocation and design. However, the experience with real-world oriented computations generates new modeling and algorithmic challenges linked to the future use of this tool. Specifically, the obtained data are related to the existing structure of regions and their subregions, and hence, because of various demographical, geographical, and industry related reasons, the data are often of various quality and heterogeneous nature from the quantitative point of view. Therefore, the computational model developed for Justine tool is modified to deal with possibility to reorganize the process of collecting and clustering data in such a way that a suitable regression-based criterion is minimized. Because of the presence of binary variables and the fact that their number is extremely large for the real-world data we suggest to implement a suitable heuristic. The paper introduces the first step in this direction and states a challenge to include more advanced heuristics in the future.
Osicka, O. (2020). Topics in cooperative game theory and logistics (Doctoral dissertation). NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway.
For logistics companies, operating in an economically efficient manner is becoming more and more challenging. Collaboration is one of the ways to improve efficiency, reduce costs and environmental impact, etc. However, its implementation is not always easy and many collaboration efforts fail to meet participants' expectations. Cooperative game theory provides tools to recognize when companies' incentives to cooperate exist as well as a framework to answer questions revolving around fairness, finding partners to cooperate with, etc. This thesis consists of four chapters addressing some of these questions within a scope of specific problems from transportation and logistics. The first chapter investigates optimal strategies of customers in a cooperative version of the traveling salesman problem with profits. The key contribution is finding that the set of optimal prizes customers need to offer to ensure being visited by a carrier coincides with the core of the underlying traveling salesman game whenever this core is nonempty. In the second chapter, several variants of the collaborative version of the location-routing problem are formulated and classified within a cooperative game-theoretic framework in terms of subadditivity, convexity, and the core. The theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments. The third chapter deals with the question of fairness in sports scheduling. A two-step approach is formulated in order to find a fair tournament schedule with respect to the distances traveled by the teams. First, by means of well-established cost allocation methods, an ideal situation is determined. Afterwards, the closest feasible schedule is found. The fourth chapter investigates coalition formation from the companies' perspective. Several approaches are formulated to determine which coalitions are optimal to pursue while taking into account the subsequent payoff or cost allocation. In addition to a novel approach to the coalition formation, the models also take into account possible uncertainty in the problem.
Osička, O. (2016). Game theory in waste management (Master's thesis). Brno University of Technology, Brno, Czechia.
In this thesis, a game-theoretic model representing a decision-making situation in the waste management is created as a noncooperative game representing the conflict of waste processors and a cooperative game representing the conflict of waste producers. For the conflict of waste processors, the Nash equilibria are used to find stable strategies on gate fee values, which serve as a good prediction for the future. To specify the strategy sets, a lower bound and an upper bound are determined. For the conflict of waste producers, assuming a cooperation among all of them, a cost distribution is determined using the Shapley value and the nucleolus. For more producers, approximation algorithms for the Shapley value and the nucleolus are developed. These algorithms are based on an assumption that distant producers can not influence each other. The model is applied to a situation in the Czech Republic. For the conflict of waste processors, one Nash equilibrium is found. For the conflict of waste producers, some producers with high potential in cooperation are recognized.
Osička, O. (2014). Teorie her na grafech [Game theory on graphs] (Bachelor's thesis). Brno University of Technology, Brno, Czechia.
The subject of this thesis is to introduce game theory and cooperative game theory in relation to graph theory. Game in characteristic function form is used to model the cooperative game. The optimal division of payoff among the players is determined by means of Shapley value and game kernel. Examples of practical use are presented. To examine more complicated game network or to express relationship between players both directed and undirected graphs are used.
Jul 17, 2019
7th INFORMS Transportation Science and Logistics Society Workshop, Vienna, Austria
May 2, 2019
1st EUROYoung Workshop, Seville, Spain
Jan 24, 2019
Best PhD Student Presentation
16th CEMS Research Seminar on Supply Chain Management, Riezlern, Austria
Jun 8, 2018
7th International Workshop on Freight Transportation and Logistics Odysseus, Cagliari, Italy
Jul 20, 2017
21st Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies IFORS, Québec City, Canada
Jan 19, 2017
14th CEMS Research Seminar on Supply Chain Management, Riezlern, Austria
Jun 8, 2016
22nd International Conference on Soft Computing MENDEL, Brno, Czech Republic
Player-centered approach to coalition formation in TU games with uncertain payoffs
Fair travel distances in tournament schedules: A cooperative game theory approach
with Guajardo, M.
2016 - 2019
2017 - 2019
BUS444 Økonometri for regnskap og økonomisk styring (Econometrics for Business Research)
master's programme, NHH Norwegian School of Economics; course responsible: Arnt Ove Hopland